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ABSTRACT

This thesis is about postwar interpretations of National Socialism. Its central aim
is to contextualize Hannah Arendt as a major thinker and historian of Nazism. This thesis
examines the Sonderweg or “special path” interpretation, as well as the critique of
modernity, or what I refer to as the “dark modernity” thesis. It ultimately situates Arendt
within the dark modernity thesis and notes her affinity to other scholarship within this
interpretation of German history.
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INTRODUCTION
“The problem of evil will be the fundamental question of postwar intellectual life in
Europe.”1
Hannah Arendt

This thesis is about different interpretations of National Socialism. My central aim
is to contextualize Hannah Arendt as a thinker and historian of Nazism. Arendt is most
widely known for her report on the 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann, a former S.S.
Lieutenant-Colonel responsible for the deportation and death of millions of Jews.
Originally published as a series of essays in The New Yorker, her book Eichmann in
Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil remains one of the most controversial texts
in the vast scholarship on Holocaust perpetrators.
When the essays were initially published, readers critiqued Arendt’s “banality of
evil” thesis for several reasons. They were abhorred by the thought that evil, especially
on such an unprecedented scale, could be considered “banal.” Critics also claimed that
Arendt’s description of Eichmann as a “cog in the wheel” of a large bureaucratic machine
excused him of his guilt. Readers were also critical of Arendt’s analysis of the role of the
Jewish Councils in the death camps. Her contentious claim that Jewish leadership
“cooperated in one way or another, for one reason or another, with the Nazis” alienated
her from Jewish communities across the world. 2 Finally, people claimed that Arendt’s

Hannah Arendt, “Nightmare and Flight,” in Hannah Arendt: Essays in Understanding 1930-1954, ed.
Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1993), 134.
2
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Classics,
2006), 125.
1
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interest in perpetrators and critique of the Jewish Councils demonstrated her lack of
sympathy for the victims.
Arendt still faces much of the same criticism today. Some critiques are valid; the
language Arendt used in her analysis of the Jewish leadership was too speculative. She
claimed, for instance, that if the Jewish leadership resisted the Nazis “the total number of
victims would hardly have been between four and a half and six million people.” 3
Nevertheless, I believe that much of the controversy surrounding Arendt and her work
stems largely from a misunderstanding of her and her intentions. It is this general
misunderstanding of Arendt and her work that informs my thesis. Because of this
misunderstanding, Arendt is generally left out of the discussion about modernity and its
relationship to Nazism. 4 But even some of the scholars who are sympathetic to Arendt do
not put her in conversation with other major interpretations of Nazism. 5 In this thesis, I
consider Arendt and her work as engaging in a larger postwar debate between historians
about how we understand Nazism.
This debate about Nazism is characterized by two distinct interpretations: the
Sonderweg thesis and the critique of modernity, or what I call “the dark modernity”
thesis. In the first chapter, I explore the Sonderweg interpretation of German history that

3

Ibid., 125.
The major historiographical essays that explore the critique of modernity and its relationship to Nazism
do not mention Hannah Arendt. See Edward Ross Dickinson, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some
Reflections on Our Discourse about ‘Modernity’,” Central European History 37, no. 1 (2004), 1-48; and
Mark Roseman, “National Socialism and Modernisation,” in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: Comparisons
and contrasts, ed. Richard Bessel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 197-229.
5
To my knowledge, major scholars such as Seyla Benhabib, Dana Villa, and Margaret Canovan do not
discuss Arendt’s position in conjunction with other historians’ critiques of modernity and its relationship to
Nazism.
4
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was popular in the 1960s and ‘70s. The “special-path” thesis suggested that Germany
lacked a strong liberal tradition and therefore never produced a liberal democratic
revolution like the rest of the West. The lack of a liberal tradition in Germany resulted in
a reversion to an authoritarian style government with the ascension of Adolf Hitler.
Within the Sonderweg interpretation historians explored various reasons as to why
Germans did not embrace liberalism. Drawing on the scholarship of Ralf Dahrendorf,
Leonard Krieger, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, and Hans Rosenberg, I organize the Sonderweg
thesis into three different themes: the intellectual, socio-cultural, and political
interpretations of German particularity. I ultimately argue that regardless of these
distinctions, the Sonderweg thesis is political. It is political insofar as it advances a liberal
conception of modernity, and in doing so assumes that as long as Germans embrace
liberal democracy, the less likely they will revert to authoritarian style political systems
in the future.
In chapter two, I begin to lay out Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of Nazism.
Arendt’s own experience as a stateless Jew in interwar Europe undoubtedly informed her
interests in Nazism and political theory later in life. While Hitler was campaigning for
votes in the 1920s, Arendt was studying philosophy at the University of Marburg. She
later earned her Ph.D. at the University of Heidelberg under the direction of Karl Jaspers,
whom she remained close with her entire life.
When Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, Arendt was working for a Zionist
organization. She claimed that during this time she “intended to emigrate” because she

3

believed that Jews could not stay in Germany. 6 Her plans were delayed, however, when
she was arrested by the Gestapo for her involvement with the Zionists. Fortunately,
Arendt was released and fled to Paris, where she worked for Jugend Aliyah, “an
organization that arranged passage for German Jewish young people to Palestine.”7 When
the Nazis invaded France, Arendt was sent to an internment camp in the Third Republic
as an enemy alien. She managed to escape to Portugal, where she then arranged to
emigrate to New York. 8 Once in New York, Arendt worked for a German newspaper
called Aufbau. Shortly thereafter, Arendt was shocked by the reports of what was
happening at Auschwitz in 1943. She claimed that she was of the opinion that
“everything else could be forgiven… but not this.” 9 Arendt therefore turned her attention
to writing what became a crucial text in her interpretation of Nazism: Origins of
Totalitarianism.10
In Origins, Arendt claimed that totalitarian regimes entirely dominated the
individual, abolishing human freedom altogether. She applied this theory to both the
victims and perpetrators. But if the perpetrators were totally dominated by the regime and
stripped of their agency, how can we hold them responsible for their crimes? Arendt’s
theory of “total domination” does not agree with her later analysis of Adolf Eichmann.

Hannah Arendt, “Zur Person: Hannah Arendt,” interview by Günter Gaus, Rundfunk Berlin –
Brandenburg, October 28, 1964, Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg Interview-Archiv: https://www.rbbonline.de/zurperson/interview_archiv/arendt_hannah.html. “Ich hatte sowieso die Absicht zu emigrieren.
Ich war sofort der Meinung: Juden können nicht bleiben.”
7
Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, “Hannah Arendt (1906-1975)” Who’s Afraid of Social Democracy? A Blog by
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, http://web.archive.org/web/20110120102031/http:/elisabethyoungbruehl.com/articles/hannah-arendt-articles/hannah-arendt-1906-1975/, 3.
8
Ibid.
9
Arendt, Interview. “Weil man die Vorstellung gehabt hat, alles andere hätte irgendwie noch einmal
gutgemacht werden können... Dies nicht.”
10
Young-Bruehl, “Hannah Arendt,” 3.
6
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Indeed, she understood Eichmann as a free agent who unthinkingly chose to submit to the
authority of the Nazi regime. I therefore argue that Eichmann in Jerusalem, published
just over a decade after Origins, represents a shift in Arendt’s understanding of Nazism.
In the third chapter, I explore what I call the “dark modernity” thesis. This
interpretation of Nazism rejected the Sonderweg thesis insofar as it did not locate the
origins of Nazism in German history but in western modernity. I explain how this
argument developed within German historiography and place Arendt within this
interpretation. I note her affinity to the arguments of Zygmunt Bauman and historian
Detlev Peukert. Each of them understood the problem of Nazism to be the result of the
desire for mastery and perfection that grew out of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment
stressed that human beings could understand the world through science and mathematics.
For Bauman, Peukert, and Arendt, this kind of thinking leads to the desire for perfection
and truth which resulted in tyranny.
Arendt also critiqued the singular and purposive kind of thinking that stemmed
from the Enlightenment. She believed that this type of thinking was manifest in modern
ideologies and worldviews. She argued that when we adopt worldviews, we reduce the
way in which we think about and understand the world. For example, capitalism makes
us think about the world solely in terms of the accumulation of wealth. Thus, for Arendt,
ideologies and worldviews dominate the way that we think. She believed that when we
obey certain ideologies, we voluntarily occlude the possibility of challenging and
undermining their authority. In doing so, we become dogmatic servants of various
regimes of authority – we become like Eichmann. Thus the only way to avoid dogmatism

5

and servitude is through “thinking” - that is, reconsidering what we once thought was
absolutely true. Finally, in the conclusion, I explore what is ultimately at stake in
Arendt’s critique of modernity and its relationship to Nazism.

***
The central intervention I wish to make in this thesis is twofold. One, I would like
to clarify Arendt’s intricate and complicated understanding of Nazism. In the process, I
hope to address some of the controversy surrounding Arendt’s work and promote her as a
serious and independent thinker of Nazism. Two, by putting Arendt in conversation with
other interpretations and major thinkers of Nazism, I hope to encourage new ways of
thinking about some of the fundamental problems of the twentieth century. However, I do
not wish to promote Arendt’s interpretation of Nazism as final and correct – to do so
would run contrary to her rejection of finality. Instead, I hope that her critique inspires us
to reconsider our own convictions, as well as warn us about the possible dangers of
dogmatism. Nazism is not just a phenomenon of the past – indeed, it is something that we
must actively confront each day through an embrace of what Arendt called “thinking.”

6

CHAPTER ONE
ORIGINS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE “SPECIAL PATH” THESIS
“History is possible only as a philosophy of history, a view that is not wholly without
foundation.”11 Theodor Adorno

Since 1945, historians have explored questions about the origins of National
Socialism. Friedrich Meinecke was one of the first to analyze what he called “the German
catastrophe.”12 As early as 1946, he claimed that Nazism was an anomaly in German
national development; “it marked a decisive break with the ‘healthy’ German past rather
than being a product of it.”13 Meinecke’s position was later advanced by conservative
historian Gerhard Ritter, who also suggested that Nazism represented something radically
new, unrelated to German history. 14 Both historians advanced an interpretation that
attempted to salvage what they understood as an otherwise honorable national history.
Their understanding of the Third Reich left historians with more questions than answers.
The nationalist interpretation failed to offer a concrete explanation as to why Nazism was
possible.
By the 1960s, scholars began to challenge the nationalist understanding of
Nazism. Historians of the Bielefeld School instead claimed that the causes of Nazism

11

Theodor H. Adorno, History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-1965, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Rodney
Livingstone (Malden, MA: Polity, 2006), 10.
12
See Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe, trans. Sidney B. Fay (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963),
originally published as Die deutsche Katastrophe (Weisbaden: Eberhard Brockhaus Verlag, 1946).
13
Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (New York:
Bloomsbury, 2015), 8.
14
Konrad H. Jarausch and Michael Geyer, Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2003), 47. Kershaw also identified Gerhard Ritter as an advocate of this
interpretation of Nazism. See Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 8.
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could be located within German national history. Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Jürgen Kocka,
for example, argued that Germany followed its own “special path” of national
development as compared to other nations in the West. In their view, the German path
was distinct because Germany never experienced a liberal democratic revolution. The
Germans’ failure to embrace liberalism resulted in a reversion to an authoritarian style
regime with the rise of Adolf Hitler. This argument became known as the “special path”
or “Sonderweg” thesis.
The fundamental assumption of the Sonderweg argument was that Imperial
Germany was politically “backward” and anti-modern as compared to other nation-states
in the West. Historians believed that if the middle class confronted the feudal elite and
collectively stood up for its interests, social and political change would have followed.
But the absence of a successful revolution instead preserved traditional social structures,
thereby strengthening the power of the elite and preventing the establishment of liberal
democratic institutions.
Some historians claim that the failed revolution of 1848 was the crucial
opportunity for Germany to undermine its authoritarian political structure. After the
French Revolution, liberal ideas began to spread throughout western Europe. These ideas
crystallized into liberal movements in France, Italy, the Austrian Empire, and Germany.
As the movements gained momentum, Western Europe experienced a series of economic
crises including bad harvests, food shortages, overpopulation, and unemployment. The

8

political and economic tensions of the time erupted in 1848, igniting a series of
revolutions across Europe. 15
In Germany, the revolution was a chance to change the existing political order.
The revolution was met with some success; the German states formed a national
assembly and planned to unify Germany under a constitutional monarchy. The problem
was that Prussia – the most powerful German state – rejected this reform. Prussia
eventually agreed to the creation of a constitution, but with the stipulation that the
monarch would retain most of his power. Conservatives who wanted to preserve the
existing order embraced the new constitution. Those who opposed it were crushed by
Prussian military forces. 16 The revolution therefore failed to disrupt the current political
order. Hence why A.J.P. Taylor claimed that in 1848 “German history reached its turning
point and failed to turn.”17
With the failure of the revolution of 1848, the authoritarian structure of the
German states prevailed. For reasons we will see, in the time both before and after
German unification the liberal democratic tradition remained weak, unable to generate
enough support for political transformation. The historians of the Sonderweg thesis
therefore tried to prove that the German authoritarian tradition prevailed amid the
weakness of the appeal of liberal democratic views. The Sonderweg argument therefore
defended the doctrine of liberalism. These historians believed that if Germans established

15

Jonathan Sperber, The European Revolutions 1848-1851 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005).
16
Ibid.
17
A.J.P. Taylor, The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of German History since
1815 (London: Routledge Classics, 2001), 71.
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a stronger tradition of liberalism in the postwar period, the less likely they would revert to
authoritarian rule in the future.
In the following chapter I explore the Sonderweg thesis and its various
dimensions. First, I identify the post-1945 origins of the special path thesis. I explain that
the thesis is rooted in economic studies of the process of modernization. I then examine
the Sonderweg argument in the work of a number of scholars including Leonard Krieger,
Ralf Dahrendorf, Hans Ulrich-Wehler and Hans Rosenberg. Taken together, their work
provides a thorough examination of the Sonderweg thesis from intellectual, sociocultural, and political perspectives. Ultimately, I argue that the advocates of the special
path thesis defended a liberal conception of modernity – that is, they understood
modernity to be necessarily characterized by the advancement of individual rights and
freedoms.18

The Emergence of the Negative Sonderweg Thesis 19

18

This argument that the Sonderweg thesis advances a political agenda is not necessarily new. In a more
recent article, James J. Sheehan argued that historians of post-war Germany viewed history as “an essential
pedagogical instrument” when it came to questions concerning their country’s political future. The novelty
of my piece consists in its holistic analysis of the origins and the various intellectual, social and political
dimensions of the special path narrative. See, James J. Sheehan, “Paradigm Lost? The Sonderweg
Revisited” in Transnationale Geschichte: Themen Tendenzen und Theorien, ed. Gunilla Budde, Sebastian
Conrad, and Oliver Janz (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 156.
19
I use the phrase “negative Sonderweg” here because research suggests that there was a notion of a
positive Sonderweg prior to 1945. Jürgen Kocka argued that “in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, many German historians were convinced of the existence of a positive ‘German way.’” They
viewed the uniqueness of the German state as “an asset, not as a liability.” According to Kocka, these ideas
were reinforced by scholars Otto Hintze and Ernst Troeltsch after the First World War. Historians Konrad
Jarausch and Michael Geyer also argued that during WWI, German scholars spoke of a distinctive and
superior German road to modernity. See Jürgen Kocka, “German History before Hitler: The Debate about
the German Sonderweg,” Journal of Contemporary History 23, no. 1 (1988): 3., and Jarausch and Geyer,
Shattered Past, 88-89.
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According to historian Mark Roseman, “under the general heading of
modernization theory the 1950s and ‘60s saw the emergence of a number of highly
influential (and largely American) accounts of the development of modern societies.” 20
Modernization theory essentially described the process by which “the traditional became
modern.”21 These scholars generally understood the “modern” to be characterized by the
advancement of the individual, the creation of democratic institutions, and the formation
of a capitalist economic system. 22
It was “against this background,” Roseman argued, that historians began to
articulate Germany’s unique relationship to modernization. By the late nineteenth
century, Germany was rapidly industrializing and well on its way to becoming a
“modern” economic state. Its political system, however, “had failed to keep in step.” 23
The German Empire’s constitutional monarchy failed to grant its population basic
political liberties that were characteristic of modern nations during this time. Thus,
modernization theory – the normative model for how a nation-state became “modern” –
formed the basis of what became the special path thesis in the field of German history.
But Germany’s unique relationship to the process of modernization was
articulated much earlier than the 1950s and ‘60s. In 1915, American economist and
sociologist Thorstein Veblen recognized that the German Empire, though economically
thriving, had a distinct political structure compared to other European countries. He

Mark Roseman, “National Socialism and Modernisation,” in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany:
Comparisons and contrasts, ed. Richard Bessel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 198.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid., 199.
20
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claimed that “the German system differs from that of other modern countries in being of
a somewhat more coercive character, comprising a larger measure of authority and a
smaller measure of popular self-direction.”24 Nevertheless, Veblen admitted that this
system worked for the Germans because it was efficient and received “the cordial
approval of the subjects of the Empire.” 25 The authoritarian political structure granted
Germans some degree of “freedom” while still operating within a tradition of “mitigated
repression” and “bureaucratic guidance.” 26
Yet, in Veblen’s view, the effectiveness of the German political system and its
approval from its subjects did not mean that the German Empire was “modern.” Germans
had “not been in contact with the things of the modern world long enough or intimately
enough to have fully assimilated the characteristically modern elements of the Western
civilization.”27 But Veblen claimed that even though the German Empire was not fully
modern, it did not mean that it “may not, for the transient time being, be all the better
off.”28 Thus Veblen did not necessarily characterize the German Empire as something
negative or inferior compared to fully modernized nation-states. Scholars generally did
not express Germany’s partial modernization as overtly negative until they understood it
as a crucial underpin of the rise of the Nazi regime.
Thomas Mann was perhaps the first to suggest that Nazism was a consequence of
Germany’s failure to politically modernize – that is, its failure to become a true liberal

24

Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1939),
230.
25
Ibid., 232.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid., 236.
28
Ibid.
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democratic state. In a speech before the Library of Congress in 1945, Mann claimed that
“Germany has never had a revolution and has never learned to combine the concept of
the nation with the concept of liberty.” 29 Mann understood liberty as it was conceived in
revolutionary France. In his view, the French Revolution generated support of egalitarian
values. The fundamental belief that all people are equal and should be granted equal
rights challenged rigid social hierarchies and promoted civic responsibility. The French
political system therefore embraced a horizontal notion of liberty that was committed to
the needs and interests of its subjects. For Mann, the French Revolution produced the
most authentic form of nationhood; France became a nation-state committed to liberal
values.30
According to Mann, Germany’s failure to produce a successful revolution meant
that Germans never embraced the same horizontal notion of liberty. Germans instead
understood liberty vertically. Beginning with Martin Luther, Mann explained that
Germans understood freedom as obedience to authority. In Luther’s terms, the only way
to achieve salvation was to cultivate a one-on-one, individual relationship with God. Thus
freedom in this sense always came from above. The German spiritual understanding of
liberty translated into the political sphere. The state secularized this vertical notion of
freedom so that individuals began to depend on the state for individual rights and
liberties. Mann claimed that Luther was to blame “for the centuries-old, obsequious
attitude of the Germans toward their princes and toward the power of the state.” 31 The

29

Thomas Mann, Germany and the Germans (Washington, DC, The Library of Congress, 1945), 10.
Ibid., 10-12.
31
Ibid., 9.
30
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German notion of liberty was responsible for the revolutionary failures of 1525, 1813,
1848, and ultimately 1918. 32
Already in 1945, Mann anticipated what became the Sonderweg thesis in full
form in the 1960s and ‘70s. He was one of the first to suggest that Nazism was a result of
Germany’s anti-modern and backward political traditions. Germany failed to become
politically modern because of its centuries old vertical conception of liberty. As we will
see, the German understanding of liberty would eventually be at the center of Leonard
Krieger’s The German Idea of Freedom – a text that is an expression of the Sonderweg
thesis from a similar intellectual perspective.

The Sonderweg: An Intellectual Analysis
Advocates of the Sonderweg thesis would agree that throughout the course of
German history, the power of the authoritarian state prevented the installation of liberal
democratic values. Where their interpretations differ, however, is in their explanations of
how and why the authority of the state went unchallenged up until the First World War.
The remainder of this chapter explores the differing intellectual, socio-cultural and
political perspectives of what I find to be the most compelling work within the
Sonderweg interpretation of German history. As the reader will see, each historian,
regardless of his or her different explanations for the German special path, not only
presupposed that liberal democracy is a necessary characteristic of the modern state, but
that its weakness enabled the continued primacy of authoritarian rule.

32

Ibid., 12.
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To begin, both Leonard Krieger and Ralf Dahrendorf in their respective works,
The German Idea of Freedom and Society and Democracy in Germany, offered an
intellectual interpretation of the Sonderweg thesis. They suggested that German ideas
about freedom and certainty strengthened the power of the German state while at the
same time restricting the possibility of liberal democratic reform. Because of the
Germans’ lack of enthusiasm for liberal democracy, Germany’s authoritarian political
structure prevailed.
Krieger argued that “the German idea of freedom” was responsible for the lack of
a strong liberal tradition in Germany. The German understanding of freedom, according
to Krieger, suggested the state was responsible for granting individual liberty. This
vertical understanding of freedom was illiberal in the sense it did not advance individual
rights and instead made individuals subordinate to the state. It was this idea of freedom,
according to Krieger, that continually undermined the German ability to challenge the
authoritarian structure of the state and establish a liberal democratic alternative. 33 He
explained that beginning in the old regime up until German unification, Germans
understood liberty to be a privilege that must be granted and acknowledged by the state.
34

In the Holy Roman Empire, aristocratic liberty was collectively represented and acted

33

This theory was later adopted by historians such as Georg Iggers in his book on the German
understanding of history. Iggers argued that German historians in the nineteenth century thought that
freedom could be achieved only through the framework of the state. German historians believed that the
“synthesis of freedom and authority” through a constitutional monarchy secured individual liberty more
than liberal democracy could. See Georg C. Iggers, The German Conception of History: The National
Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present (Middleton, CT: Wesleyan University Press,
1968), 15.
34
Krieger defines the old regime as a time period “from the Protestant Reformation to the French
Revolution.” Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition from the
Reformation to 1871 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 9.
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on by the prince. As the rulers of various principalities began to consolidate their power
and transform into monarchial states, the power of the prince to expand or restrict his
subjects’ freedom increased. By the age of absolutism, German individual liberties were
fully absorbed into the authority of the monarchy.35
Soon the ideals of the French Revolution presented a threat to the authority of the
German state. The influx of liberal ideas into German society prompted Germans to
confront their previously held notions about liberty and the state. Krieger, however,
argued that philosophers Immanuel Kant and G. W. Friedrich Hegel addressed the
problem of liberty in ways that reaffirmed the standard German conception of freedom.36
Kant was a “representative figure of German liberalism,” who, according to Krieger,
recognized the need for greater political freedom in German society. 37 But Kant
reconciled the need for political freedom with his support of an absolute monarchy.
Krieger claimed that Kant believed greater freedom could be achieved only through the
existing political order, rather than through revolution. Kant’s ideas, according to
Krieger, supported the traditional claim that the state was the vehicle for the expansion of
freedom.38

35

Ibid., 50- 71.
It is important to note Krieger’s reading of Kant and Hegel is problematic. In contrast to Krieger’s views,
Herbert Marcuse claimed that “the German idealists unanimously welcomed the revolution, calling it the
dawn of a new era, and they all linked their basic philosophical principles to the ideals that it advanced.”
Hegel in particular viewed the French Revolution as an embrace of the concept of reason, which was
significant in his dialectic. Indeed, his philosophy of the state depended on the rational realization that man
was a communal being. He therefore viewed the French Revolution as an embrace of the ideal of a
communal, egalitarian society. See Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social
Theory (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), 3-29.
37
Ibid., 86.
38
Ibid., 105, 124.
36
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In Krieger’s view, Hegel more assertively affirmed the authoritarian structure of
the state. Hegel, according to Krieger, believed that “the fulfilment of individual freedom,
rights, [and] interests depended upon the individual’s conscious adoption of the universal
order manifested in the state.”39 Hegel advocated for the complete transcendence of the
individual in order to form a more universal state that embodied the rights and freedoms
of its subjects. Thus Hegel’s ideas maintained the principle that freedom could only be an
instrument of the state and thereby upheld the German authoritarian political structure. 40
Both Kant and Hegel’s ideas, according to Krieger, represented the continued primacy of
the state over individual liberties.
Even as the liberal movement gained momentum in the mid-nineteenth century,
German liberals were divided over whether to reform the current political system or to
radically break with it. Krieger argued that the divisions among liberals prevented any
significant political change from taking place. When concessions were made, they were
made within the existing political structure. In this sense, freedom always came from
above instead of being generated from below, as in the British or French examples. The
German idea of freedom, therefore, restricted the possibility of establishing liberal
democracy in Germany. Germans valued the state as the embodiment of the individual,
allowing authoritarian regimes to further consolidate their power over their subjects.
Similar to Krieger, Dahrendorf emphasized that throughout German history,
Germans favored a strong state over their need for individual rights. Unlike Krieger,

39
40

Ibid., 133.
Ibid., 132-138.
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Dahrendorf did not attribute the German support of the state to a particular notion of
freedom. Instead, he argued that the support of the state came from the German desire for
certainty and synthesis over conflicting political views. According to Dahrendorf, liberal
democracy is necessarily characterized by conflict within the political sphere. “Conflict is
liberty,” he claimed, “because by conflict alone the multitude and incompatibility of
human interests and desires find adequate expression in a world of notorious
uncertainty.”41 The expression of human needs and desires allowed for the possibility of
opposing opinions. He believed that conflict as such had the power to generate social
change. According to Dahrendorf, Germans did not see the importance of conflict and
plurality. They instead wished to evade conflict and the uncertainty that it perpetuated.
Germans desired stability and they believed they could find it within the state. The idea
that the state could and should transcend the political realm of conflict restricted the
possibility of liberal democratic reform.42
Like Krieger, Dahrendorf turned to Hegel to support his claims. In his view,
Hegel’s ideas demonstrated the German evasion of conflict and desire for synthesis.
Hegel argued that man found his greatest expression as a human being not as an
individual in society, but as a member of the state. Hegel developed this idea in his
dichotomy between civil society and the state. Civil society, characterized by competing
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individual interests, classes, and parties, was ineffective in regulating the behavior of
human beings. The state, however, could transcend the uncertainty and conflict in civil
society and offer the human being access to truth and morality. As a member of the state,
man could be “guided by the certainty of an authority that was no longer partisan
itself.”43 The state was superior to the individual, and thus, individual rights were not a
priority.44 Hegel’s ideas illustrated his own preference for the universal state over the
particular individual. Dahrendorf believed that Hegel’s ideas had a tremendous amount of
influence on German political thought. 45
Dahrendorf also suggested that German nationalism demonstrated the German
desire for synthesis. In order to become a more unified and powerful state, thinkers such
as Heinrich von Treitschke believed that the individual had to sacrifice himself for the
good of the nation. Dahrendorf claimed that “time and time again the demands of the
nation had to serve, in German history, to suspend civil society and with it the vital
questions of men.”46 The desire for unity and power distracted the Germans from internal
civil liberties and occluded the possibility of individual progress.
The rise of Hitler, in Dahrendorf’s view, was also evidence of the German desire
for synthesis rather than conflict. He claimed that Germans in the interwar period were
hesitant to adopt democratic pluralism, and thus found Hitler and the Nazi party
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appealing. Hitler made Germans believe he was “allied with ‘providence’” and had the
“certainty of the moral idea on his side.” 47 Hitler’s success based on his appeal to
certainty demonstrated that Germans in Weimar Germany were uncomfortable with
political conflict.
Even after the fall of the Third Reich when the Germans began to adopt liberal
values, Dahrendorf believed that they still preferred certainty over political conflict. He
claimed that when West Germans were asked whether they thought it was best to have
multiple political parties or political unity, the majority of Germans wished to see the
formation of unified coalitions. The creation of a coalition, according to Dahrendorf,
suppressed plurality insofar as it symbolized an end to party conflict. 48
In the end, both Krieger and Dahrendorf demonstrated that German ideas –
whether about freedom or synthesis – strengthened the authority of the German state. The
potential for liberal democratic reform was weak in a society that emphasized the
primacy of the rights of the state over individual liberties. In associating the strength of
the authoritarian state with the failures and weakness of liberalism, Krieger and
Dahrendorf presupposed the superiority of liberal-democracy.

The Sonderweg: A Socio-Cultural Analysis
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Like Krieger and Dahrendorf, Hans-Ulrich Wehler highlighted the German
concept of the state as a reason for the lack of a liberal tradition in German history.49 But
Wehler also explored various political and socio-cultural realities of Imperial Germany
that he believed affirmed the authority of the state and restricted the possibility for
reform. The policies of Otto von Bismarck as well as socialization processes within the
education system presented threats to the liberal movement in the German Empire. His
conclusions about Bismarck’s Germany have drawn considerable attention, but for the
purpose of this chapter, I would like to focus on Wehler’s social and cultural
understanding of the German state through his discussion of the education system. 50
According to Wehler, education in Imperial Germany preserved existing social
hierarchies. Students who belonged to higher social classes were given greater
opportunities to further their education. The majority of students in Germany attended
elementary school, but only a small fraction of those who attended elementary school
would continue on to grammar school, and an even smaller percentage continued on to
university. Since university admission was so competitive, Wehler argued that the
educated class “continually reproduced itself” allowing the educated elite to control the
upper levels of the German education system.51 After their schooling was complete, the
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privileged elite were often granted the highest administrative or judicial positions based
on their affiliations. 52
German education perpetuated the rigid social structure in Imperial Germany, but
more important for Wehler was the kind of education that students received. Beginning in
elementary school, teachers reinforced patriotism and preached virtues such as
“diligence, [the] fear of God, obedience and loyalty.”53 The goal of public education
under Wilhelm II was to purge any liberal or socialist ideas from the school systems and
cultivate patriotism. When students reached the university level, Wehler explained that
there was strong “pressure towards political conformity.” 54 Various disciplines promoted
the idea of a strong state in order to justify the current political conditions. Universities
aimed to strictly control opinions and thus became a breeding ground for political and
social conservatives.55
By the time students reached grammar school and university, they had the
opportunity to join various organizations that promoted these same ideas. Organizations
such as the Wandervogel supported “anti-liberal, anti-democratic, anti-urban and antiindustrial” values.56 Its members rejected the modern world and wanted to return to a
more natural way of life. 57 This movement, Wehler argued, emboldened the youth with a
strong sense of nationalism as they fought in the battles of WWI. Other organizations
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included student fraternities, in which middle class men were taught aristocratic norms
and values. The feudalization of the bourgeoisie was one of the main functions of
university fraternities. This socialization process was also carried out by the officer
reserve organizations. In the elite’s view, the more the middle class became acquainted
with elite traditions and values, the less power they had to undermine the existing social
and political structure. 58
But if so few Germans had access to higher education, then only a small
percentage of Germans were actually subject to the socialization processes that Wehler
described. The middle class and educated elite were taught to obey the state, but what
about the rest of the German population? What prevented them from embracing liberal
views? Wehler does not formally address this problem other than to suggest that Germans
had a subservient mentality. Because of this mentality, Germans “passively accepted the
actions and encroachments of the state.” 59 They were routinely inclined to conform
instead of protest. According to Wehler, the many years that Germans were subject to
princely rule shaped their servile mentality. This mentality, in addition to the
socialization processes in the education system were some of the reasons why Germans
failed to challenge the authority of the state and create a liberal democratic revolution. 60
Both the German subservient mentality and socialization process within the
school system reinforced German loyalty to the monarchy and weakened the appeal of
liberal ideas. The authority of the German state, according to Wehler, rested on the social
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and cultural conditions which generated support for the monarchy outside of the political
sphere. Here, too, we see that Wehler privileged liberal views and assumed that if the
Germans had fully embraced liberalism, the authoritarian political structure could have
been undermined.

The Sonderweg: A Political Analysis
Hans Rosenberg, in contrast to Krieger, Dahrendorf, and Wehler, analyzed
Germany’s lack of a liberal democratic revolution from a strictly political perspective. In
his book Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience 1660-1815,
Rosenberg attempted to understand how each of these institutions interacted with one
another during old regime. He was particularly interested in the transformation of the
bureaucracy into an absolutist institution. Rosenberg explained that by 1815, the Prussian
political system was characterized by a period of “bureaucratic absolutism.” During this
time, the authority of the German state was no longer embodied in the monarchy but
existed within the ranks of the civil service.
Rosenberg began his study at the time when Frederick William of Brandenburg,
the Great Elector, began to consolidate his power over various Prussian estates. By
bringing other estates under his control, Frederick William ushered in a period of
centralized financial and military administration in Prussia. In this period of early
Prussian absolutism, he created a class of civil servants that would be in charge of
carrying out his wishes. Frederick William appointed men of various backgrounds,
including judges, army officers, and university students to administrative positions. When
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his grandson Frederick William I took over the throne, he increased the number of
positions occupied by military officers. But it was also characteristic of Frederick
William I to appoint non-noble commoners to administrative positions. 61 The addition of
commoners into state service “disturbed and confused the old social system, built on birth
and privilege, on hierarchy and hereditary estate distinctions.” 62
The emergence of the new bureaucrat challenged the notion that only wealthy
landholders were fit for service. Rosenberg argued that the nobles still had a significant
advantage when it came to social advancement, but often times were “impeded or
blocked by the successful competition of ‘immodest’ commoners.”63 Tensions increased
between the old aristocratic elite and the new bureaucrats. The competition for greater
control and influence within the administrative realm reached new heights. Eventually the
new bureaucracy began to absorb the old elite within their own ranks of royal service and
tensions between the two dominant groups eased. The reorganization of the civil service,
now fit to include members of the old official hierarchy, Rosenberg claimed, resulted in a
check of the power of the absolute monarch. 64
The bureaucracy continued to expand throughout the course of the eighteenth
century. The size of the bureaucracy alone made it difficult for the monarch to supervise
and control their undertakings. Consequently, the bureaucracy “came to enjoy a high
degree of hierarchical self-government.”65 For instance, bureaucrats limited the power of
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the monarch by taking control of their own recruitment. Rosenberg also argued that the
concept of Bildung was crucial in the emancipation of the bureaucracy from the absolutist
control of the monarch. “The spread of Bildung,” he claimed, “powerfully reinforced the
yearning for greater individual and corporate freedom in professional life; for more
authority and responsibility.”66 But with Frederick II in charge, Rosenberg argued that the
bureaucratic detachment from the monarch was negative in nature; Frederick II still had
the ultimate power. After Frederick’s death, however, the power of the bureaucracy
increased. 67 The bureaucrats recognized their status as a superior ruling class and,
according to Rosenberg, “was ready to assume political mastership.” 68
In the period that followed, the bureaucracy completely transformed from a
political force under the control of the monarch to a mostly autonomous, absolutist
institution. While the bureaucracy was ultimately subordinate to the Prussian King, legal
sanctions and royal ordinances were signed by administrative ministers rather than the
monarch. In addition, there were no constitutional checks on bureaucratic power. Thus,
the monarch’s role was severely limited when he was banned from intervening with the
operations of the administration. 69
The newfound authority of the bureaucracy faced opposition from both the
monarch and the Junker elite. In order to solidify their power over the king, the
bureaucracy allowed wealthy land owners to share in some of the governing. Just as
dynastic absolutism was based on an agreement between the Hohenzollerns and the
66
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landowning elite, bureaucratic absolutism functioned on an agreement between the civil
administration and the squires. 70
Together the two ruling groups were able to curtail liberal and democratic
movements up until 1848. Rosenberg claimed that in order to preserve their interests as
elite groups, both the bureaucracy and the aristocrats “had a common interest in keeping
the Prussian people almost free from acquiring political experience.” 71 In their view,
extending political representation to the lower classes, in their view, would have
threatened the existence of the current political order. To preserve their own self-interest,
the ruling Junkers and bureaucrats suppressed radical ideas that threatened their
authority.72
In his post-script, Rosenberg argued that it would be a mistake to look for the
roots of totalitarianism in the peculiar traits of the Prussian government. He nevertheless
confirmed the Sonderweg theory that German history unfolded in a way that diverged
from the liberal democratic societies in the West. It would be impossible to understand
Germany’s peculiar history, he claimed, “without the Prussian legacy.” 73 The
characteristics of the Prussian elite in 1815 were still the characteristics of the ruling class
in the Imperial period. Rosenberg pointed to “pride and vanity, the fear of losing superior
status and resentment of the mounting power of the opposition” as factors that
strengthened the authoritarian attitude of the ruling elite in the late nineteenth century. 74
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It was this attitude, combined with the economic and parliamentary crises, that
contributed to the rise of national socialism in later periods of German history. 75
Rosenberg’s understanding of authority of the state hinged on the bureaucracy’s
transformation from a tool of an absolute monarch to a pseudo independent, absolutist,
governing institution. He claimed that a manipulative group of elites who held
tremendous political power affirmed the authority of the German state. But what
Rosenberg failed to recognize is that a state run by an efficient bureaucracy was not
something unique to Germany. Geoff Eley, for instance, argued that the presence of a
productive and skilled bureaucracy is not “backward,” but instead a mark of the modern
state.76 Nevertheless, Rosenberg, like the rest of the advocates of the Sonderweg
interpretation, attempted to prove that the presence of an all-powerful state hindered
Germany’s chances for a successful liberal democratic revolution.

***
Krieger, Dahrendorf, Wehler, and Rosenberg introduced various explanations as
to why the liberal tradition remained weak and the authority of the German state went
unchallenged. In their view, the German idea of freedom, the German desire for certainty,
the educational system, and the legacy of the Prussian bureaucracy each affirmed the
power of the German state, making it difficult for liberal ideas to generate support among
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the German people. Consequently, they assumed that the embrace of liberal-democracy
would have challenged and undermined the authoritarian tradition in German history.
At stake in this view of German history is a liberal understanding of modernity
that associates the “modern” with liberal democratic political structures. These historians
ultimately used their platform to advance their own beliefs about the primacy of the
individual and individual rights. They argued that the “modern” was something to strive
for because as history demonstrated, its incompleteness – as in the case of Germany –
could result in catastrophe. But, as we will see, the liberal notion of modernity would
soon be challenged with a wave of scholarship in the 1980s. These historians would
suggest that modernity is not necessarily characterized by liberal democracy. A state
could be considered modern and have modern features without being liberal democratic.
These scholars instead argued that the origins of Nazism are located in western
modernity.
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CHAPTER TWO
HANNAH ARENDT’S INTERPRETATION OF NAZISM

Considered to be one of the greatest political thinkers of her time, Hannah Arendt
is known for her complex and often controversial explanations of the twentieth century’s
most imminent questions: why do people commit evil acts and how do we understand
totalitarianism? Arendt confronted these issues most famously in her texts Origins of
Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Taken
together, these texts do not represent one single view or understanding of Nazism.
Instead, Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, published over a decade later, marks a shift in
her interpretation of Nazism.
In Origins, Arendt explored the conditions that enabled the rise of modern
dictators such as Adolf Hitler. She identified widespread anti-Semitism, the desire for
world domination, and isolated masses as key conditions in which modern totalitarian
regimes emerged. Once in power, Arendt argued that totalitarian regimes represented a
novel form of government. She distinguished totalitarianism from other forms of
governing such as despotism, tyranny, dictatorship and authoritarianism. Unlike these
forms of government, totalitarianism “does not curtail liberties or abolish essential
freedom.”77 It instead disposes of human freedom altogether. The totalitarian domination
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of the individual was most clearly seen in the dehumanization of prisoners in Nazi
concentration and death camps. But even the perpetrators, she suggested, were “thrown
into the movement” and unable to think or challenge the Nazi worldview. Totalitarian
regimes altogether destroyed man’s capacity to think and made human beings
superfluous.
Years later, Arendt published Eichmann in Jerusalem, a controversial text based
on her observations of Adolf Eichmann’s trial in the early 1960s. Originally published as
a series of articles in The New Yorker, Arendt’s conclusions about the Eichmann trial
received significant criticism. Scholars believe she portrayed Eichmann as a dominated
individual, and thus, argue that Arendt excused him from his murderous actions.
This critique can be found in an especially clear manner in the work of historians
Bettina Stangneth and Richard Wolin. In her book Eichmann Before Jerusalem: The
Unexamined Life of a Mass Murder, Stangneth sought to undermine Arendt’s analysis of
Eichmann as a banal, obsequious bureaucrat. She relied on new evidence to suggest that
Eichmann was indeed an anti-Semitic ideologue who fooled many, including Arendt,
with his defense that he had only followed orders. Stangneth was generally critical of the
secondary literature that “parroted” the view that Eichmann was “just a small cog in
Adolf Hitler’s extermination machine.” 78 In a book review, Wolin praised Stangneth’s
conclusions. He claimed, “one of the outstanding merits of Stangneth’s comprehensive
account is that she shows that Eichmann was anything but a faceless cog in the
various methods of conditioning.” Hannah Arendt, “What is Authority?” in Between Past and Future (New
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machine.”79 The problem with Arendt’s analysis, Wolin argued, was that she created a
narrative that managed “to downplay the executioners’ criminal liability.” 80
Eichmann’s defense certainly adopted this narrative; he was not responsible for
the death of millions of Jews –– so he claimed –– but rather it was the system in which he
was a cog that was responsible. He claimed that if he had not done it, somebody else
would have. But upon closer reading, it is clear that Arendt’s understanding of Eichmann
is misunderstood by Stangneth and Wolin. Indeed, Arendt affirmed Eichmann’s guilt
based on the fact that he voluntarily surrendered his ability to think – that is his ability to
form judgments – and submitted to an authority in order to advance his career.
Consequently, Eichmann and his actions were complicit in a regime that carried out mass
murder. She did not view Eichmann as a puppet with conditioned reflexes. He was not a
totally dominated individual that was helplessly thrown into the Nazi movement. He
instead was a self-interested individual who was in total command of himself. Thus,
Arendt’s portrayal of Eichmann does not fit the picture of totalitarian domination that she
introduced years earlier. Eichmann was someone capable of resisting, but instead chose
to submit to an authority that carried out crimes against humanity. 81
I am not the only one to critique the view that Arendt portrayed Eichmann as a
dominated individual and thus, deprived him of his agency and responsibility. Many
scholars claim that Arendt did not merely view Eichmann as a dominated cog, but as a
free, responsible agent. Dana Villa, for instance, claimed that Arendt did not view
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Eichmann as an automaton, but one among criminals that “willingly participate in crimes
legalized by the state.” Similarly, in an edited volume of essays on Arendt, Richard
Bernstein emphasized her rejection of the cog theory and assertion of his responsibility. 82
The originality of my position is that it considers Arendt’s understanding of Eichmann as
a free individual with regard to her theory of total domination that she introduced in
Origins.
In the following chapter, I aim to offer a more complete picture of Arendt’s
understanding of Nazism as it evolved over the course of several decades. I first analyze
Arendt’s theory of total domination as described in Origins. I then compare this
understanding of Nazism to the one Arendt introduces in Eichmann in Jerusalem. Based
on these two texts, as well as a number of additional essays, I argue that Arendt’s
portrayal of Eichmann represents a significant shift in her understanding of Nazism.
Finally, I address the significance of Arendt’s conclusions about Nazism and how they
prompt us to reconsider how we understand freedom and evil.

Total Domination
According to Arendt, totalitarianism “becomes total when it becomes independent
of all opposition; it rules supreme when nobody any longer stands in its way.” 83 To
eliminate opposition from their societies, totalitarian regimes combined ideology with
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terror. Their ideology was based on their narrative of history, and terror, Arendt argued,
was the essence of the regime.
Nazi ideology was based on what Arendt called the laws of nature or history. The
regime’s adherence to these laws is one way it was distinguished from despotism, tyranny
and dictatorship, and authoritarianism. The regime was neither lawless, nor was it
arbitrary. It instead claimed to obey strictly the laws of nature and history. Based on these
laws, the Nazis argued that the Aryan race was superior, destined to outlive all other
races. Arendt claimed that totalitarian law “promises to release the fulfillment of law
from all action and will of man; and it promises justice on earth because it claims to make
mankind itself the embodiment of the law.” 84 Totalitarian regimes molded man into an
“active unfailing carrier of a law to which human beings otherwise would only passively
and reluctantly be subjected.” 85
Through the use of terror, Hitler and the Nazis transformed their ideology into an
alternate reality. Terror was physical force that the regime used to actualize its ideology.
They believed it was their duty to “provide the forces of nature or history with an
incomparable instrument to accelerate their movement.” 86 Essentially, this meant that
Germans could kill off races they deemed as “unfit to live,” instead of “waiting for the
slower and less efficient processes of nature or history themselves.” 87 Since the laws of
nature determined the extinction of these races anyway, the Nazis claimed it was logical
to set these forces in motion.
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Based on the laws of history, human behavior in Nazi society was guided by what
nature itself had already decided; people were designated either perpetrators or victims. 88
Whatever happened, happened according to the logic of the laws of nature. Thus, every
act was carried out in the name of the law and of the acceleration of the movement;
“every single act is the execution of a death sentence which Nature or History has already
pronounced.”89 In this way, the laws of totalitarian society entirely dominated the way the
individual thought. There was an explanation for everything that occurred, whether it
took place in the past, present, or future. According to Arendt, Nazi ideology caused
Germans to surrender their freedom of thought “for the strait jacket of logic with which
man can force himself.”90
The total domination of the individual, Arendt claimed, was most clearly
observed in the death camps. The purpose of the Nazi camps was “not only to
exterminate people and degrade human beings, but also serve the ghastly experiment of
eliminating, under scientifically controlled conditions, spontaneity itself as an expression
of human behavior and of transforming the human personality into a mere thing.” 91
Robbing the individual of his or her spontaneity – that is, according to Arendt, one’s
capacity to start something new – was a necessary prerequisite for total domination. 92
Spontaneity was the enemy of total control because it was incalculable. As such,
spontaneity had the capacity to undermine and resist the power of the regime. Thus,
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Arendt claimed that “total power can be achieved and safeguarded only in a world of
conditioned reflexes, of marionettes without the slightest trace of spontaneity.” 93
In order to transform men in the camps into mere puppets, the regime followed a
three-step process. First, it stripped the individual of his/her civil rights. The regime
outlawed innocent people from the state. In relinquishing the individual’s political rights,
one can arbitrarily arrest somebody without his or her consent. Scholar Dana Villa
clarified Arendt’s point best: once “the juridical person has been effaced… the continued
‘total disenfranchisement of man’ becomes possible.”94 The second step in this process
was to kill the moral person in man. The Nazis took away the prisoners’ ability to choose
between good and evil and instead forced them to decide “between murder and murder.”
It became impossible to do good. Prisoners were confronted with the difficult decision of
either sending their friends or complete strangers to their deaths. The triumph of
totalitarian terror, Arendt explained, occurred when “the consciously organized
complicity of all men in the crimes of totalitarian regimes is extended to the victims and
thus made really total.”95 The regime essentially forced populations to participate in their
own destruction.
The final step in stripping the human being of all spontaneity was to destroy his
individual identity. The destruction of the individual’s identity was made possible by
assuming total control over human beings’ deaths. Death itself belongs to the individual.
For instance, nobody can experience my death but myself, and therefore my death is
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certainly my own. Yet Arendt claimed that the Nazis “took away the individual’s own
death, proving henceforth nothing belonged to him and he belonged to no one.” 96 The
Nazis reified death by completely isolating the individual from his or her death. From the
moment that they arrived in the camp, the prisoners’ manner and time of death was
already determined. The camp system essentially made the process of dying permanent.
The destruction of the individual’s rights, moral agency, and identity were
essential steps in destroying freedom and entirely dominating human beings. This process
robbed men of their spontaneity and turned them into marionettes with conditioned
reflexes. The process was successful; Arendt claimed that prisoners marched to their own
death without protest or resistance. Humans were completely mastered, living in a rigid
state of submission. For Arendt, the horror of the camps was a kind of radical evil,
unprecedented in human history. She emphasized that one of the most distinguishing
characteristics of totalitarian government was that it proved “everything is possible.”
Man’s power was greater than anyone had ever dared to imagine.
The total control over the individual in the camps, as well as the one-dimensional
thinking the regime enforced, formed the basis of what Arendt understood as a totally
dominated society. But her theory of total domination is problematic for several reasons.
In this interpretation of Nazism, human agency is ultimately at stake. In order for an
entire society to be under total control of the regime, the regime must “eliminate
precisely the capacity of man to act.”97 This then raises the question that if the individual
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is incapable of acting independently, can the individual be held responsible for his or her
actions while totally under the control of the regime? If total domination denies human
agency, the human being has no choice but to become a part of the system. How, then,
can we hold the perpetrators accountable for their actions?
These questions and concerns are appropriate in the context of Arendt’s analysis
of total domination. Scholars, however, tend to place Arendt’s analysis of Eichmann into
this framework of total domination, and thus misinterpret her as excusing Eichmann of
his role in the death of millions of Jews. 98 In this case, not only do scholars
misunderstand Arendt’s banality of evil thesis, but they do not acknowledge the
important revision she makes to her understanding of Nazism. Eichmann was not a
dominated individual, but someone who actively chose to support the Nazi regime.
Arendt affirmed Eichmann’s free agency and thus affirmed his guilt and responsibility.

Who was Adolf Eichmann?
Eichmann was in exile in Argentina for a decade before being captured and
arrested by Israeli intelligence. Subsequently, Arendt was sent by The New Yorker to
report on his trial in 1961. During the trial, she was perplexed by the fact that Eichmann
appeared “terrifyingly normal.”99 Eichmann did not represent the monstrous and demonic
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Nazi one might imagine. His ordinary demeanor led Arendt to the conclusion that
wickedness was not a prerequisite for evildoing. She argued that “he did not enter the
party out of conviction, nor was he ever convinced by it.” 100 Thus, the ideology itself did
not dominate the way Eichmann thought about the world. However, he did rigidly obey a
set of rules that resulted in mass murder. The question then becomes why? Was he forced
to obey? Did Eichmann have a choice? Arendt’s analysis of Eichmann’s life both before
and during his time in the S.S. confirms her belief in his free agency.
Arendt described the young Eichmann as a mediocre student who dropped out of
school to start working for his father’s electrical business. For this reason, his family and
peers considered him a failure. After working for his father for a number of years,
Eichmann began a job in sales for the Austrian Elektrobau Company. Arendt claimed that
Eichmann at this time was “twenty-two years old and without any prospects for a career;
the only thing he had learned, perhaps, was how to sell.” 101 Just two years later,
Eichmann left his job with the electric company and became a vacuum salesman. Thus,
until 1932, Eichmann led an ordinary life. 102
By 1932, Eichmann was unsatisfied with his job in vacuum sales. For whatever
reason, he no longer enjoyed his work. Later that year, Eichmann joined the N.S.D.A.P.
just before losing his job with the Vacuum Oil Company. His failed attempt in sales led
him to turn to the Nazi party for a career. Eichmann moved to Germany and decided to
enlist as an S.S. soldier. Arendt described his motivation for the career change:
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From a humdrum life without significance and consequence the wind had blown
him into History, as he understood it, namely, into a Movement that always kept
moving and in which somebody like him – already a failure in the eyes of his
social class, of his family, and hence in his own eyes as well—could start from
scratch and make a career. 103
Up to that point Eichmann’s life had been characterized by disappointment and
failure. As Arendt implied in the quote above, Eichmann viewed a new career in the S.S.
as an opportunity to redeem his unsuccessful past. Evidently, after months of training,
Eichmann realized that being a soldier would not bring him the satisfaction he desired.
After hearing that the Security Service of the Reichsführer had positions available,
Eichmann took advantage of the opportunity and successfully applied for the job. 104
Much to Eichmann’s disappointment, however, his new job in the S.S. was not
what he expected. Arendt argued that his disappointment “consisted chiefly in that he had
to start all over again, that he was back at the bottom.”105 He was initially a file person for
the information department, which he found boring. But contrary to his past experience,
Eichmann worked his way through the ranks of the S.S. By 1938, just three years after
accepting an internship with the department of Jewish affairs, Eichmann was in charge of
the “forced emigration” of German Jewry. 106 By 1941, he was promoted four times,
ultimately achieving the title of lieutenant colonel. Arendt wrote, “and there, to his great
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grief, he ‘got stuck’; as he saw it, there was no higher grade obtainable in the section in
which he worked.”107 At this point in his career, he was considered the “expert” on
Jewish evacuation. 108
When put on the stand during his trial in 1961, Eichmann made himself out to be
a clown, using various clichés and stock phrases that shielded him from the reality of his
own actions. The judges characterized his defense as “empty talk.” Arendt supported
their claim: “no communication was possible with him.”109 He had an unreliable memory,
and when he did remember any specific details about his time in the S.S, his memories
were of the turning points in his career. Thus, in her final impression, Arendt understood
Eichmann to be an ambitious careerist. Arendt’s portrait of Eichmann is not one of an
individual who was totally dominated or forced into obedience. Instead, he was entirely
in command of himself when he submitted to the authority of Nazism. The basis of his
obedience was his interest in career advancement; an interest he pursued at the expense of
millions of lives.
The most compelling evidence of Arendt’s affirmation of Eichmann’s agency
and guilt, at least in this text, appears in the epilogue. Arendt reimagined the judges’ final
address to Eichmann. She responded to Eichmann’s claim that anybody could have taken
his place, and that potentially all Germans are guilty: “guilt and innocence before the law
are of an objective nature, and even if eighty million Germans had done as you did, this
would not have been an excuse for you.” 110
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Arendt makes this claim again in an essay on personal responsibility in
dictatorships: “in a courtroom there is no system on trial, no History, or historical trend,
no ism, anti-Semitism for instance, but a person, and if the defendant happens to be a
functionary, he stands accused precisely because even a functionary is still a human
being, and it is in this capacity that he stands trial.” 111 In this quote, Arendt clearly
repudiates the defense’s cog theory, as well as the claim that she excused Eichmann from
his responsibility. For Arendt, the cog-theory is inadmissible in court. It did not matter
that Eichmann claimed to have no ill intentions. It did not matter that if he had not done
it, someone else would have. The cog in the wheel defense does not absolve the
individual from his actions; the fact remains that he “carried out, and therefore actively
supported, a policy of mass murder.”112 Even if the theory was valid in court, it does not
explain why Eichmann became a cog in the first place. Arendt claimed that the moment
an individual enters the court room the question is not “how did this system function,”
but “why did the defendant become a functionary in this organization?” 113 This implies
that she believed there is always a possibility to resist.
At the end of her imagined address to Eichmann, Arendt asserted that “in politics
obedience and support are the same.” 114 This point is worth exploring further. In a
subsequent essay, she argued that no man can accomplish anything without the support of
others. Essentially those who obey him “actually support him and his enterprise” since
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“without such ‘obedience’ he would be helpless. 115 To put it more clearly, a leader cannot
lead without the consent of others. Arendt claimed that since a revolution against a
government represents the withdrawal of public consent, obedience must be characterized
as consent and support. In fact, she argued we should trade the term “obedience” for
“support” in political thought. Instead of asking, “why did you obey?” the question
should always be “why did you support?” 116
Arendt’s identification of obedience with support is crucial. According to
philosopher Alexandre Kojève, to obey means to hold back voluntarily the possibility of
opposing any kind of authority. When I submit to someone else’s rule, I am thereby
relinquishing my ability to resist. My act of obedience is therefore free in the sense that
there is always the possibility of opposing it, and I myself have chosen to resist that
possibility.117 Put in these terms, obedience is free consent by definition, otherwise one
would be forced to obey by compulsion of some kind.
Let us briefly return to Arendt’s portrait of Eichmann. Aside from his fervent
careerism, Arendt characterized him by his genuine inability to think. She assumed that if
he had only thought about what he was doing, he would have realized that his actions
were wrong. In her later work, Arendt attempted to demonstrate that the activity of
thinking could prevent men from committing evil acts.118 Arendt used Kant’s distinction
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between Vernunft (reason) and Verstand (intellect) to illustrate thinking’s ability to
prevent evil. According to Arendt, Kant described intellect as the faculty of the mind that
concerns itself with knowledge. Reason, however, corresponds to humans’ need to think.
Knowledge presupposes one has learned everything there is to learn on a given topic, but
thinking is never final. Arendt explained that thinking “leaves nothing so tangible behind,
nor can it be stilled by allegedly definite insights of ‘wise men.’” 119 In this sense,
thinking is completely free and limitless. It produces no doctrine or creed.
Thinking instead has the ability to destroy all doctrine. Arendt claimed that people
who do not think “hold fast to whatever the prescribed rules of conduct may be at a given
time in a given society.”120 Thinking, however, had the capacity to destroy those rules. To
use Arendt’s terms, thinking “unfreezes” doctrine that is “frozen” into our minds. In other
words, when I stop and think, I challenge my previously held judgments and in the end
become perplexed, unsure of what I initially thought was beyond doubt. Hence Arendt’s
claim that thinking is a “dangerous and resultless enterprise.” 121 It is a danger to any
doctrine and does not put forward a new one.
When Eichmann decided to obey the Nazi regime, he voluntarily surrendered his
ability to think and resist, and instead adhered to a doctrine without ever pausing to
reflect and question it. In this sense, Eichmann had the opportunity to resist, but freely
denied that opportunity. Arendt’s portrayal of Eichmann proves that the Nazi regime did
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not totally dominate the individual. If this were the case, the human being would have no
agency. He or she would be incapable of resisting and therefore Arendt’s entire concept
of thinking would collapse. Eichmann was not deprived of his agency, but freely chose
to become a functionary in a regime that committed mass murder.

On Freedom and Evil
Arendt’s conclusions about Eichmann challenge the way that people traditionally
understand evil in the West. Because of the tremendous influence of Christianity, evil is
typically understood as demonic and extraordinary. Arendt instead argued that the evil
doer is not necessarily monstrous or demonic. But she did not mean that the action itself
is not monstrous. Nevertheless, scholars like Wolin claimed that her characterization of
Eichmann as banal marginalized the Holocaust, making the genocide of 6 million Jews
itself “banal.”122 Arendt instead made it clear that she was interested in “the phenomenon
of evil deeds, committed on a gigantic scale, which could not be traced to any
particularity of wickedness, pathology, or ideological conviction in the doer.” 123 In her
analysis of Eichmann, Arendt demonstrated that depravity or wickedness is not a
necessary condition for evil-doing. In the Nazi regime the unthinking banal bureaucrat
was just as capable of carrying out mass-murder as the wicked, convicted anti-Semite.
Arendt also challenged the Christian notion of original sin. Within the Christian
tradition, Saint Augustine was one of the first thinkers to raise questions about the nature
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and origins of evil. Evil was a problem for Christians because it casted doubt on the
omnipotent and omniscient nature of God. In other words, evil posed the question: if God
is good and all knowing, then why does evil exist in the world? In his famous text, On the
Free Choice of Will, Augustine claimed evil came from human freedom. 124 He had to
claim that humans were responsible for evil, otherwise one could trace the existence of
evil back to God. In his view, evil was the consequence of humans freely disobeying
God’s will. In the Christian tradition, evil was therefore associated with disobedience.
In locating the origins of evil in humans’ free will, Augustine encountered another
fundamental problem. If evil were merely a consequence of human action, then evil is
historical.
And if we believe that evil is historical, then we assume it can be remedied. We assume
that we can create a world without the problem of evil; we can achieve peace on earth. If
this were the case, the entire concept of Heaven, where humans achieve salvation, would
collapse. There would be no need for God. Thus, even though Augustine associated evil
with free will, he needed to affirm that sin or evil doing was somehow permanent. He
therefore developed the concept of original sin. According to Augustine, the moment that
Adam disobeyed God and ate the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden, humans became
naturally evil. His concept of original sin affirmed the permanence of evil in the world.
We can only achieve peace and salvation in Heaven. With his concept of original sin,
Augustine limited human freedom; humans can never overcome their sinful nature.
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The conception that evil is something fixed and permanent dominated the way
humans thought about evil in the West. Major thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes claimed
that in the state of nature humans are naturally violent and evil, concerned only with selfpreservation. For Hobbes, the best way to moderate the problem of evil was to form
societies and create laws that protect us from our evil nature. 125
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was one of the first major thinkers to challenge
Augustine’s notion of original sin. In response to Hobbes, Rousseau imagined the state of
nature as completely free in the sense that it was free from social inequality which for
Rousseau, leads to violence and evil. The moment that the human declared “this is mine”
was an assertion of ownership that distinguished one human from another. This assertion
of distinctiveness is what created inequality and suffering in the world. His conclusions
about evil were profound. He affirmed Augustine’s initial equation of evil with human
freedom.126 In doing so, Rousseau assumed that evil was historical and therefore that it
could be remedied.
Like Rousseau, Arendt’s conclusions about Nazism rejected the concept of
original sin and instead claimed that evil came from human freedom. Instead of assuming
that the human being is naturally sinful, she claimed that the human being was free.
Arendt demonstrated through Eichmann that in freely obeying various regimes of
authority we can perpetuate evil. The horrors of Nazism were committed by people who
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freely chose to commit them. In this sense, Arendt was optimistic about the possibility of
eliminating evil and human suffering in this world.
Arendt also rejected the Christian notion that evil comes from disobedience. In
the case of Eichmann, Arendt demonstrated that evil does not always come from
disobedience, but rather obedience. In a society where the laws were so easily inverted
from “thou shall not kill,” to “thou shalt kill,” obedience became dangerous. 127 Eichmann
was evil because he obeyed Hitler’s orders.
Arendt’s conclusions about Nazism demonstrate that our traditional conception of
evil fails us when we try to understand the evil of Nazism. Her banality of evil thesis
challenged the idea that the evil doer is wicked and demonic. Moreover, she proved that
evil does not always come from the instances when we disobey authority, but often in the
instances when we obey it. Ultimately, Arendt’s understanding of evil assumes that we
can reduce the problem of evil in this world; indeed, Arendt believed that we could
minimize the problem of evil through thinking. 128

***
In this chapter, I have brought attention to what I see as a significant shift in
Arendt’s understanding of Nazism. With her initial publication of Origins of
Totalitarianism, Arendt introduced an interpretation of Nazism that suggested the regime
totally dominated every individual in its sphere of governing. This view of Nazism was
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problematic because it stripped the individual of his or her agency and therefore made it
difficult to assign responsibility for crimes against humanity. Years later, after the trial of
Adolf Eichmann, Arendt began to rethink and reshape her initial conclusions.
Consequently, the interpretation of Nazism that she introduced in Eichmann in Jerusalem
returned agency back to the individual, thereby affirming individual culpability.
In her final analysis of Nazism, Arendt repudiated the traditional narrative that
evil was radical and demonic. Instead, she proved that even the most banal bureaucrat
could transform into a mass murderer. In the case of Adolf Eichmann, it required
voluntary, unyielding obedience to a strict doctrine or worldview, even if he was not
convinced by it himself. In this sense, Arendt believed that evil was a choice that could
be moderated through thinking. In the next chapter I explore where Arendt locates the
problem of Nazism historically and attempt to situate her interpretation within a broader
critique of modernity in German historiography.
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CHAPTER THREE
HANNAH ARENDT AND THE CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY
“The challenge of Nazism shows that the evolution of modernity is not a one-way trip to
freedom. The struggle for freedom must always be resumed afresh, both in enquiry and in
action.”129 Detlev Peukert

The central question of this chapter is: where might Arendt’s understanding of
Nazism situate her within German historiography? Arendt did not support the Sonderweg
thesis. She never considered Nazism to be the result of the lack of a strong liberal
tradition in German history. 130 Indeed, she claimed that “the posing of the ‘German
problem’ by spreading the notion that the source of international conflict lies in the
iniquities of Germany (or Japan) has the effect of masking the actual political issues.” 131
For Arendt, the Sonderweg thesis was political propaganda; it was used to shape “public
opinion for certain political steps.”132 In locating the origins of Nazism in German
national history, the advocates of the Sonderweg thesis encouraged the belief that “the
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crushing of Germany is synonymous with the eradication of fascism.” 133 The assumption
of the special path thesis was that if Germans work to establish a stronger tradition of
liberalism in post-war Germany, the less likely Germans would support future
authoritarians. In this sense, the Sonderweg thesis prevented people from recognizing that
the problem of Nazism was not exclusive to the German nation-state. In Arendt’s view,
the origins of Nazism are indeed more pervasive. Nazism and the horrors that
accompanied it were a negative consequence of European modernity. 134
In this essay, I situate Arendt within what I call the “dark modernity”
interpretation of Nazism. This interpretation of German history challenged the
Sonderweg narrative and in various ways demonstrated that Nazism was an outgrowth of
the pathologies of western modernity. In order to explain how she fits into this
interpretation of German history, I first explore the evolution of the critique of modernity
and its relationship to Nazism within German historiography. I begin by explaining how
historians David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley undermined the Sonderweg thesis,
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prompting historians to explore origins of Nazism in European modernity. I then compare
the work of some of the key scholars of the dark modernity narrative, including Geoff
Eley, Zygmunt Bauman, and Detlev Peukert. They each understood Nazism to be a
negative outgrowth of modernity but traced its origins to different characteristics of the
modern age. I then address some of the more recent literature on the dark modernity
thesis and how it suggests that future historians should approach the critique of
modernity. Finally, I offer my interpretation of Arendt’s understanding of the relationship
between modernity and Nazism. I note her affinity to both Baumann and Peukert, who
believe the modern desire for mastery can lead to tyranny. I also explain how she
believed that in the modern era, humans adopt and adhere to dogmatic worldviews that
dominate the way that we understand the world. Worldviews are therefore a form of
authority that make human beings “thoughtless”; they diminish our ability to challenge
and undermine their authority.

The “Dark Modernity” Thesis in the Historiography of Nazism
The Sonderweg narrative dominated German historiography until it was
challenged by two British scholars, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley. In their
collaborative work, The Peculiarities of German History, Blackbourn and Eley critiqued
the notion of a unique German path to modernity. In their view, one of the fundamental
problems of the Sonderweg thesis was that it assumed that Imperial Germany was
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politically “backward” because did not represent the interests of the middle class. 135
Historians like Wehler assumed that because Germany was not liberal democratic, the
bourgeoisie was unable to assert itself politically, and instead solidified the power of the
ruling elites. In his later work, Eley claimed that an authoritarian state – in this case the
Kaiserreich – “might also articulate the interests of the bourgeoisie and might even
provide a framework for the latter’s social and political hegemony.” 136 In other words,
Eley believed that a state did not have to be liberal democratic in order to represent the
interests of the middle class. He argued that the Kaiserreich’s municipal governments,
social administration, male suffrage, and political mobilization proved that it was less
“backward” and more “modern” than the advocates of the Sonderweg implied.137
For Eley, the Kaiserreich “showed itself adaptable to the tasks that a ‘modern’
state is called upon to perform.” 138 If the German state indeed could be considered
“modern”, what broad connections could be made between modernity and the rise of
Nazism? Eley explored these questions in an essay entitled “What Produces Fascism:
Pre-Industrial Traditions or A Crisis of the Capitalist State?” As indicated by the title,
Eley argued that the crisis of a modern capitalist state enabled the rise of Nazism. To
argue that Nazism was an outgrowth of Germany’s preindustrial traditions would echo
the claims of the supporters of the German Sonderweg.139 Eley instead argued that
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Germany experienced an accelerated capitalist transformation – a transformation at a
pace that “outstripped the adaptive capabilities of the existing political institutions.”140 In
other words, the speed at which Germany transformed into a modern capitalist society
had significant consequences when it came to the Germans’ confidence in the existing
political institutions.
Beginning in the 1890s, Eley argued that the educated citizenry was frustrated
with the German state’s inability to account for the economic interests of the industrial,
agrarian, and bureaucratic social classes. As a result, a radical nationalist movement
emerged that challenged the “largely liberal and parliamentary” structure of the state. 141
The movement argued for unity among the classes. It also supported political
reorientation based on the consent of all classes in order to regain the confidence in the
German state. This “right wing populism”, as Eley termed it, attracted the support of the
emerging bourgeois class because it embodied its own cultural aspirations. Eley used the
rise of right-wing populism to suggest that radical nationalist ideology appealed to people
regardless of their social stature. He therefore undermined the classic Sonderweg claim
that Nazism owed its rise to the traditional, anti-modern elite who felt threatened by an
increasingly industrial society. Indeed, he argued that amidst the overwhelming economic
and political crises of the Weimar Republic, the Nazis generated support from all social
classes. Thus Eley sought to demonstrate that the victory of Fascism came at a time when
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an illegitimate state failed to manage the economy and create social unity in a dynamic
capitalist society.
To put it more simply, Eley believed that the origins of Nazism could be located
in Weimar’s political crisis that was born out of its modern capitalist state. Eley’s
interpretation is a standard Marxist critique of modernity. Whereas Eley traced the
problems of modernity and Nazism to capitalism, other critics of modernity believed that
the problem of Nazism was closely connected to the Enlightenment rationalism and the
desire to master nature.
In his book Modernity and the Holocaust, Zygmunt Baumann explored the issues
of modernity, Nazism, and the Enlightenment. In the preface, Bauman emphasized that
Nazism and the Holocaust were “born out of and executed in our modern rational
society.”142 He critiqued the Sonderweg thesis, claiming that we must recognize the
problem of Nazism as a larger problem of society, civilization, and culture. In his view,
the danger in emphasizing the Germanness of the crime, is that it exculpated everyone
else. “The more ‘they’ [the Germans] are to blame,” Bauman claimed, “the more the rest
of ‘us’ are safe, and the less we have to defend this safety.” 143 His aim in this text,
therefore, was to situate the problem of Nazism not as an anomaly in the otherwise
‘normal’ paths to modernity, but as “another face of the same modern society whose
other, more familiar, face we so admire.”144
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Baumann believed that the Holocaust embodied the Enlightenment project which
suggested humans can eliminate suffering and master nature. The Nazis’ vision of a
perfect world was a world without Jews. They believed that if they eliminated their
enemies, they would eliminate German suffering and create what they understood as a
perfect society. Nazism therefore demonstrated the potential danger of the belief in
human perfectibility and the horrifying means that people could use to create the
“perfect” world. Moreover, Nazism also revealed the capacity of modern technology and
industry to conduct mass murder. According to Bauman, genocide was a “technological
achievement of an industrial society.” 145 For Baumann, the Nazi use of technology was
another expression of their desire to eliminate German suffering and master nature.
More important for Bauman was the role that modern bureaucratic society had in
organizing and orchestrating mass murder. He claimed that mass murder “depended on
the availability of well-developed and firmly entrenched skills and habits of meticulous
and precise division of labour, of maintaining a smooth flow of command and
information, or of impersonal, well-synchronized co-ordination of autonomous yet
complimentary actions.”146 Bureaucratic rationality, therefore, was a necessary condition
in the efficient implementation of mass murder. Without Eichmann’s precision and
detailed coordination of the deportation of European Jews, would the Holocaust have
been possible? For Bauman, even the idea of a final solution was the product of
bureaucratic rationalism; “the choice of physical extermination as the right means to the
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task of Entfernung was a product of routine bureaucratic procedures: means-ends
calculus, budget balancing, universal rule application.”147
Bauman therefore demonstrated that the Holocaust was not a product of German
irrationalism or anti-modernism but was a “legitimate resident in the house of
modernity.”148 Critics of Bauman argued that his analysis ignored the motivations for
genocide. Bureaucratic rationality, in their view, did not explain why Jews were
specifically targeted. They claimed he did not address the role that anti-Semitism played
in the Holocaust. 149 This critique of Bauman’s work, however, fails to recognize the
chapters in the text where Bauman addressed the problem of anti-Semitism. Baumann
affirmed the role that anti-Semitism played in the Holocaust, but argued “that it cannot by
itself account for the Holocaust’s uniqueness.” 150 For Baumann, bureaucratic rationality
radicalized anti-Semitism and other forms of racism. It introduced a new “modern” form
of racism insofar that its purpose was to eliminate that race.
Baumann explored the modern features of the Nazi regime including the desire to
master nature, the use of technology and bureaucratic rationalism. He proved that the
Nazis were modern in a way that few historians had addressed and traced the problem of
Nazism back to the Enlightenment. Like Bauman, Detlev Peukert explored the inevitably
“modern” aspects of the Nazi regime. In his text The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of
Classical Modernity, Peukert identified a fundamental problem with the Sonderweg
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thesis. The special path thesis, in his view, was based on a modernization theory that
defined German history against an “idealized notion of ‘western’ social evolution.” 151 He
therefore questioned the value of modernization theory in explaining the origins of
Nazism. Peukert instead argued that historians needed to operate under a “more
empirical, descriptive concept of ‘modernity’ and ‘modernization.’” 152
Peukert defined modernity in economic, social, cultural, and intellectual terms.
Economically modernity meant industrial production, technology, bureaucratic
administration and a “small, but productive agricultural sector.”153 Socially, modernity
was characterized by the control of wages and division of labor. Culturally, modernity
was the creative arts’ break with “traditional aesthetic principles and practices.” 154 In an
intellectual sense, Peukert identified modernity with western rationality, whether in
science, technology, or social planning. 155 If modernity is defined by these terms, Peukert
claimed that the process of modernization was a “complex interwoven set of historical
changes” that gave rise to these features of modern society. 156 According to Peukert, “the
crucial factor governing a society’s stability and survival” is “the way in which that
society deals with these broadly inevitable tensions.” 157 Peukert used these definitions to
evaluate how German society responded to the abrupt set of changes and the tensions that
these institutions created.
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In the German case, modernization arrived in “a sudden and uncompromising
manner,” which was exacerbated by economic and political crises related to WWI. 158
According to Peukert, Weimar experienced rapid advancement in science and
technology, as well as in the humanities. These advancements were accompanied by the
“culmination of a process of rationalization and efficiency, not only in technology and the
economy, but in the social structure and in people’s daily lives.”159 Thus Weimar bore the
stamp of “modern” like other societies during this time. But Peukert argued that Weimar
was ill-prepared to accommodate the sudden and abrupt social changes taking place in
German society. In the face of economic collapse, the Weimar Republic had “little or no
growth in wealth to distribute,” and failed to maintain control over wages and benefits.
Consequently, Weimar saw an increase in social fragmentation and polarization within
society. Weimar’s inability to accommodate social change was met with “a deep-seated
sense of unease and disorientation, an awareness that the conditions underlying everyday
life and experience were in flux.” 160 For Peukert, the Weimar Republic was a “unique
conjunction” of the processes of modernization and severe economic and political crises.
Weimar caved to these pressures, ultimately generating public support for an
authoritarian regime. People no longer had faith in liberal democracy.
Nazism appealed to the people because it challenged the contradictions of
modernity. It offered “a conclusive new answer to the challenges and discomforts of the
age.” 161 The victory of Nazism in 1933, Peukert argued, demonstrated that modern
158
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institutions and the process by which they came into existence were indeed fragile.
Weimar demonstrated how easily the processes of modernization could lead to
catastrophe.
The Nazi response to Weimar’s crisis of classical modernity was to reform
society through a radical racial policy. For Peukert, the Nazis did not solely represent an
anti-modern movement that promised to restore the old social order of German society.
Even though their rhetoric was anti-modern, the Nazis used modern means to carry out
their utopian vision. According to Peukert, they “envisaged a society with modern
technologies and institutions but owing nothing to the ideals of equal rights,
emancipation, self-determination and common humanity.” 162 Nevertheless, Peukert
believed the Nazi vision of an ideal society embodied the rhetoric of bureaucratic
rationalism and mastery. Here Peukert and Bauman’s analyses overlap. Peukert argued
that the “scientific final solutions of social problems” were taken to “the ultimate logical
extreme, encompassing the entire population in a bureaucratic racial-biological design
and eradication of all sources of nonconformity and restriction.” 163 In other words, the
systematic operation of Nazi racial policy was a product of bureaucratic rationalism
because it used logical and scientific means to efficiently accomplish its goal. Like
Baumann, he viewed the Nazi racial policy as an expression of the modern, rational
attempt to master nature.
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In addition to modern racial policy, the regime also made use of modern
technology in order to wage war. Peukert argued that during the Weimar period the Nazis
represented a revolution against the tensions of modernity, but soon realized they needed
to adopt the trends of modernity (specifically bureaucratic rationalism and technology) to
achieve their utopian vision. Thus, in Peukert’s view, Nazism “demonstrated with
heightened clarity and murderous consistency, the pathologies and seismic fractures of
the modern civilizing process.” 164
Eley, Bauman, and Peukert analyzed modernity and the origins of Nazism during
the 1980s. Their somewhat dated analysis prompts the question: where do historians
stand on the dark modernity thesis today? Recent literature on the “dark modernity”
interpretation explored the implications of Bauman and Peukert’s analysis of Nazi racial
politics. In an article on biopolitics, fascism, and democracy, Edward Ross Dickinson
situated Nazi racial policy in a larger framework of biopolitics. 165 He affirmed that
biopolitics was a characteristic of modernity insofar that it takes a scientific and rational
approach to social problems. In this sense, he recognized the reprehensible aspects of
biopolitics: “it coerces, cajoles, massages, and incentivizes its citizens into behaving in
certain ways.”166
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But his fundamental concern with the literature on the subject is that it fails to
recognize the discontinuities between the traditional practice of biopolitics in the Weimar
welfare-state and the Nazis’ radical racial policy. He claimed that “the Nazi variant of
biopolitical modernity was in fact quite idiosyncratic.”167 The immediacy and force at
which the Nazis approached racial politics, for Dickinson, was extraordinary. Nazi racial
policy therefore represented a shift from the strategies and principles of biopolitics in the
Weimar era. Dickinson believed that Peukert and Bauman’s analysis of the pathology of
racial science was too narrow-minded; it neglected the “ways in which biopolitics has
made life tangibly better.”168 Indeed, Dickinson believed that biopolitics could create
more opportunity for people and empower them. He recognized that biopolitics could be
practiced in different ways in different modern societies. Thus he argued for the need to
insert the positive attributes of biopolitics back into our discourse about modernity. The
dark modernity thesis, in his view, was too pessimistic. He instead introduced a view of
modernity that suggests there are “multiple modernities” with “radically differing
potentials.”169 But Dickinson’s claim that we need to recognize modernity for both its
positive and negative potential misses the central point of the dark modernity thesis –
which is to identify modernity’s shortcomings.

Arendt’s Critique of Modernity
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In a number of her major works – The Life of the Mind, Origins of
Totalitarianism, and Eichmann in Jerusalem – Hannah Arendt explored the relationship
between modernity and Nazism. She understood Nazism to be a problem of modernity
for two main reasons. One, like Baumann and Peukert, she believed that technological
drive to master or overcome nature leads to tyranny. Two, she believed that the
Enlightenment encouraged a kind of singular and purposive thinking that is manifest in
modern ideologies and worldviews. These worldviews promote one way of
understanding the world. In doing so, they attempt to dominate the way that people think
and therefore leads to dogmatism and servitude.
Like Baumann and Peukert, Arendt understood modern technology as an attempt
to overcome and master nature. In her text The Human Condition, Arendt claimed that
technology such as the telescope or airplane helped us to “shrink the world” and in doing
so alienated us from it. What she meant is that technology allowed us to gain more
knowledge and understanding of the world that was at one time difficult for us to
comprehend. Our increased knowledge of the world enables us to take “full possession”
of our dwelling place; the world transformed into something that humans attempt to
perfect and master. For Arendt, the desire for perfection and mastery makes us concerned
exclusively with ourselves. She thought by attempting to master nature and become
perfect, humans tried to eliminate their sufferings and overcome temporality. Thus our
desire to dominate and master the world alienates us from our own worldliness – that is,
the very fact that we are suffering, temporal beings. 170 Similar to Baumann and Peukert,
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Arendt believed that this desire for perfection -- for “final solutions” -- leads to tyranny.
Indeed, they each traced the origins of Nazism back to the Enlightenment and the desire
to master nature through the use of technology.
Arendt also believed that the Enlightenment promoted a singular understanding of
the world which she believed leads to dogmatism and a failure to think. She claimed that
“with the rise of the modern age, thinking became chiefly the handmaiden of science, of
organized knowledge.”171 This statement essentially meant that in the modern era, our
foundations for knowledge changed. Humans no longer believed that their knowledge of
the world came from God. Indeed, the sentiment that “God is dead” suggested that we no
longer grounded our understanding of the world in metaphysics. Instead humans came to
believe that the world could be explained through reason. For Arendt, thinking solely
through reason was reductive. It limited our understanding of the world insofar as it
suggested that science and reason were the sole foundation for true and complete
knowledge. It discouraged any other kinds of thinking, and in doing so, dominated the
way human beings thought about the world.
The calculative, purposive thinking that grew out of the Enlightenment and
scientific revolution was manifest in various ideologies and worldviews of the modern
era. Ideologies and worldviews promoted a singular understanding of the world in the
same way that the Enlightenment encouraged humans to think solely in terms of reason.
In this sense, Arendt characterized modern, dogmatic worldviews as forms of authority
that dominate the way people think. Arendt’s interest in forms of authority became the
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basis for her text Origins of Totalitarianism. The title of the German edition more
precisely captures what Arendt tried to accomplish in her text. The German title is:
Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft, which can be translated as “elements and
origins of total authority.” Arendt therefore was not exclusively interested in the origins
of totalitarianism, as the English title indicates. Rather, she was interested in the history
of anti-Semitism, imperialism, and totalitarianism, and how they evolved into authorities
that dominated the way people thought about the world.
Anti-Semitism, for instance, promoted the view that all problems of society could
be traced back to Jews. There is a long history of both political and social discrimination
against Jews. But Arendt revealed that Jews faced a new and unprecedented kind of antiSemitism in the modern era. In the Christian era Jewishness was understood as a crime
that could be redeemed through conversion. Jewishness in the modern era, however, was
seen as a vice from which “there was no escape”; Jewishness was permanent. 172 In the
modern era, Arendt demonstrated that Jews also became the targets of conspiracy
theories such as the Dreyfus Affair. Consequently, the public increasingly began to blame
Jews for everything that they disliked about society. Arendt claimed that “if they [the
mob] hated society they could point to the way in which the Jews were tolerated within it;
and if they hated the government they could point to the way in which the Jews had been
protected by or were identifiable with state.” 173 Thus anti-Semitism in the modern era
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transformed into a form of authority that understood the world solely in terms of its
hatred of Jews.
Arendt also understood imperialism as a form of authority. Imperialism
encouraged people to think in terms of self-preservation. In this section of Origins,
Arendt used Hobbes to highlight the ideology of imperialism. Hobbes believed that man
was driven by his material interests, most notably by the desire for wealth and power.
Arendt argued that the individual desire to accumulate power and wealth generated a
worldview that culminated in imperialism and empire building. 174 Imperialism, pursued
by the capitalist bourgeoisie, was therefore a singular, authoritative worldview because it
forced its believers to think of the world solely in terms of wealth and power.
In the final section of the text, Arendt described totalitarian ideology as a form of
authority that sought to totally dominate the way people thought. 175 Let us take a closer
look at her analysis of the Nazi worldview.176 Arendt argued that the Nazis understood
the world in terms of race. They claimed that the laws of history and nature demonstrated
that the Aryan race was superior, destined to outlive all other races. The Nazis therefore
believed that it was their duty to “provide the forces of nature or history with an
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incomparable instrument to accelerate their movement.” 177 Essentially, this meant that
Germans could kill off races deemed as “unfit to live,” instead of “waiting for the slower
and less efficient processes of nature or history themselves.” 178 Since the laws of nature
determined the extinction of these races anyway, the Nazis claimed it was logical to set
these forces in motion. The main target of their racial policy was the Jews.
While campaigning for votes throughout the 1920s, Hitler claimed that Jews were
responsible for German misfortunes. Moreover, he argued that the Jews were conspiring
for world domination and that the Germans needed to fight them and emerge as the rulers
of the world. In this way, the Nazis’ racial ideology dominated the way people thought
about world. It made people believe that Aryans would one day rule the world and that in
order to achieve world domination, they must rid the world of enemy races.
But how is that people came to recognize and obey these singular, authoritative
worldviews? In Origins, Arendt claimed that isolated masses of modern European society
found meaning in these movements. She argued that the masses were politically
indifferent people “whom all other parties had given up as too apathetic or too stupid for
their attention.”179 The isolated individual was loyal to these movements because they
gave him or her a sense of belonging in a world where they had little to no other social
ties.180
Another reason that people came to recognize and obey worldviews is because
these views grounded their legitimacy in their possession of the truth. Indeed, according
177
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to Arendt’s definition of authority, the source of its legitimacy transcends the contested
realm of politics. 181 If the authoritarian grounded his or her legitimacy in the political
sphere, his or her authority is more likely to be contested or disproven. For example,
Hitler’s story of Jewish conspiracy transcended the political sphere because it was
beyond verifiable experience. He therefore promoted his ideology as absolute truth.
According to Arendt, Nazi ideology was “no longer an objective issue about which
people may have opinions,” but was “as real and untouchable an element in their lives as
the rules of arithmetic.”182
But as we have seen with Arendt’s portrait of Eichmann, people obey certain
regimes of authority without necessarily believing in the ideology itself. In Eichmann’s
case, he recognized Hitler’s authority because of his interest in self-advancement. Indeed,
Eichmann viewed Nazism as an opportunity to redeem his unsuccessful past and work his
way up the ranks of a powerful bureaucratic order. Arendt therefore introduced multiple
reasons why people obey authority. To generate the support of the isolated masses,
authoritarian movements gave them a sense of belonging. People also supported regimes
of authority based on that authority’s appeal to external truth. In other words, they were
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convinced by its understanding of the world. Others recognize authorities because of their
own selfish interests in a particular movement, as demonstrated in the case of Adolf
Eichmann.
Whatever the basis of one’s obedience, Arendt demonstrated through Eichmann
that recognition of authority is always a choice. Nevertheless, she believed that once
people recognized a given authority, that authority attempted to entirely dominate the
way people thought about and understood the world. Indeed, the success of authoritarian
regimes or worldviews depended on their ability to restrict the possibility of challenging
that worldview. Modern authorities made people adopt and adhere to its ideology without
ever considering the potential consequences of that view. Hence why Arendt
characterized Eichmann as “thoughtless” in the sense that he unthinkingly adhered to
strict set of principles which resulted in mass murder. In Arendt’s view, the triumph of
Nazism was therefore a consequence of a singular type of thinking, or what she
understood as the absence of thought, which emerged out of the Enlightenment. Nazism
was a form of domination that was made possible in the modern era.
To reiterate, authoritarian regimes and worldviews restricted one’s ability to
challenge their authority and turned humans into “thoughtless” beings. However, Arendt
believed that there is always a possibility to undermine authority through thinking.
Thinking in this sense, should not to be confused with Arendt’s analysis of the singular
kind of thinking of the modern era. Whereas the calculative thinking of the
Enlightenment leads to various forms of domination, “thinking” for Arendt was a way to
free ourselves from the control of these singular worldviews. Arendt’s project of thinking
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enables us to challenge dogmatic doctrines and therefore reevaluate what we initially
thought was absolutely true. Indeed, thinking is emancipatory for Arendt because it frees
us from the bonds of dogmatism that in the case of Nazi Germany, proved to be
dangerous.
Arendt’s argument that modern authorities and worldviews were forms of
domination raises the following question: if worldviews have the capacity to become
dogmatic and dominate the way that we think, how might we make judgments and form
opinions about the world without lending ourselves to dogmatism and servitude?
Arendt’s discussion of Socrates offered one possible answer. Socrates, according to
Arendt, was able to think without becoming a philosopher – that is, he did not produce a
doctrine, nor did he impose his view or opinions on others. Instead, when Socrates
engaged with the citizens of the polis, he taught them how to think. Arendt used three
similes to describe Socrates: he was a gadfly, an electric ray, and a midwife. He was a
gadfly because he aroused the citizens of the polis to thinking. He encouraged them to
examine their opinions. At the same time, Socrates was an electric ray. By encouraging
the citizens to think, Socrates paralyzed them. According to Arendt, “the paralysis of
thought is two-fold.”183 One, it made someone stop whatever it was they were doing to
think. Two, thinking had “a paralyzing effect when you come out of it, no longer sure of
what had seemed to you beyond doubt while you were unthinkingly engaged in whatever
you were doing.”184
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Finally, Socrates functioned as a midwife. While encouraging citizens to think
and purging them of their judgments, Socrates also helped the citizens realize that there
was an element of truth in their opinions. According to Arendt, Socrates understood that
reality appeared differently to different people, and that reality could be expressed in a
variety of ways. If each person shared in the belief that there was an element of truth in
others’ interpretations, we would no longer seek to dominate others. That is to say,
thinking and dialogue would unite people based on their common understanding that no
one opinion was more correct or truthful than the other. Those engaged in the
conversation would then recognize that they had no right to assert their viewpoint over
someone else. The result of this type of dialogue was that each person walked away
transformed by the conversation. It produced no result other than to equalize both of its
participants. Socratic dialogue thus has the potential to create communities that celebrate
and support a plurality of opinions. This imagined community creates the foundation for
a world without the problem of domination. 185

***
For Arendt, the modern desire for mastery and dogmatic thinking are fundamental
problems of modernity that she believed lead to various forms of tyranny. Like Baumann
and Peukert, she argued that our desire for perfection was a problem because it alienates
us from our worldliness and encourages us to pursue final answers and solutions. In
addition, she argued that modern ideologies and worldviews promoted one understanding
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of the world. In doing so, these ideologies became forms of authority that dominated the
way we think. For Arendt, Nazism was just one example of an authority that dominated
human beings. As a form of authoritarianism, Nazism generated support in various ways,
one being its claim that it possessed the truth. Once people recognized Nazism as a
legitimate form of authority, the Nazis attempted to occlude any form of opposition. It
therefore turned humans into unthinking beings who strictly adhered to Nazi ideology.
Consequently, the regime was able to execute mass murder to the degree at which the
world had never witnessed before. For these reasons, Arendt can be situated within the
“dark modernity” interpretation of Nazism.
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CONCLUSION
MODERNITY AND THE HUMAN BEING

In the previous chapter, I revealed the affinity between Bauman, Peukert, and
Arendt’s understanding of Nazism as a consequence of western modernity. They each
identified the origins of Nazism within the pursuit of mastery and perfection stemming
from the Enlightenment. This kind of thinking suggested that humans could master nature
and, in their view, Nazism was a consequence of the desire for human perfectibility. The
Nazi vision of German sovereignty and the elimination of German suffering motivated
them to pursue final solutions. In my conclusion, I would like to address what is at stake
in this understanding of German history, especially for Arendt. In her view, modernity
threatens what it is to be human.
Arendt understood the human being in terms of its worldly activity. For Arendt,
our vita activa, or “active life” is comprised of three activities: labor, work, and action.
Labor is essentially what humans do in order to stay alive. It is a necessary activity
insofar as its aim is to continue the process of life. In contrast to labor, work is that which
produces “objects for use.” 186 Action, for Arendt, is the activity between men – that is,
the way human beings interact, communicate, and distinguish themselves from one
another.187
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These three activities, according to Arendt, “are intimately connected with the
most general condition of human existence: birth and death, natality and mortality.” 188 In
other words, each of these activities is bound to the fact that humans are born, they live,
and they die. Labor is concerned with the sustainability of life. Work is connected to
death because it produces objects that outlive the human being. Action, however, is
primarily connected with birth. Arendt claimed that the moment someone is born, they
“possess the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting.” 189
Of the three activities, action is of fundamental importance. For Arendt, action is
what makes us plural beings; it affirms our uniqueness. In acting, we reveal information
about who we are, including our “qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings.” 190 Arendt
claimed that through acting humans reveal “their unique personal identities and thus
make their appearance in the human world.” 191 If action is what distinguishes us from
others, then to be human means that we are our own creative beings. We are never “the
same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.” 192 Any action is an expression of
our distinctiveness and therefore an expression of our humanness. Without action, Arendt
believed we would cease to be human: “a life without speech and without action, on the
other hand…is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no
longer lived among men.”193
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Arendt associated action with natality because with every new birth, the human’s
capacity for action is renewed. Arendt hinted at the importance of natality in Origins as
well. She described beginning as that which is the “supreme capacity of man.” 194 For
Arendt, it is beginning — or the renewed capacity to act — which has the capability to
undermine all tyranny. We are born free with the ability to creatively define and express
ourselves in contradistinction to others. 195
For most of human history, according to Arendt, action was the chief activity of
the vita activa – it occupied the highest position in the hierarchy of action, labor and
work. Nevertheless, the human capacity for action was indeed fragile. Arendt claimed
that “the conviction that the greatest that man can achieve is his own appearance and
actualization is by no means a matter of course.” 196 Human uniqueness is not certain and
therefore could be challenged or undermined. Indeed, Arendt claimed that throughout
western history, humans challenged the importance of action within the public realm.
They have searched for alternatives to action “in the hope that the realm of human affairs
may escape the haphazardness and moral irresponsibility inherent in a plurality of
agents.”197 She explained that the creation of monarchies and other forms of one-man rule
were ways to combat the problem of plurality. One-man rule limited human activity in
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the public realm because it suggested that only the ruler needed to concern himself with
politics.
But these traditional attempts to limit human action were ultimately unsuccessful.
Arendt claimed that the downfall of one-man rule is that it worked too well. Banning
citizens entirely from the public sphere motivated rebellion and therefore led “to an
inevitable loss of power.”198 In other words, banning humans from acting in the public
sphere inspired individuals to reassert their role in political affairs. Nevertheless, she
demonstrated that people have challenged what it is to be human in earlier periods of
history.
In addition to monarchies and other forms of one-man rule, Arendt identified
man’s desire to make products as the fundamental threat to the primacy of action. Homo
faber – or the identification of the human as a creator – is not concerned with action, but
instead values things based on utility. But the creator is not interested in the use of tools
“in order to build a world, but in order to ease the labors of its own life process.” 199 The
creator makes products in order to sustain his or her own life. As such, homo faber
concerns itself with the activity of labor and not of work. The human as creator dismisses
action as mere “idlebusybodyness and idle talk” and judges social activities solely “in
terms of their usefulness to supposedly higher ends.” 200 The creator always values
making over acting. For Arendt, homo faber’s desire “to make the world more useful and
more beautiful” alienates the human being from who he or she truly is – a unique and
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creative being.201 But for much of human history, labor was unsuccessful in replacing
action as the highest and most important activity in the hierarchy of the vita activa.
In the modern age, however, the hierarchy of the vita activa was reversed. Labor,
or man as a creator replaced action in the hierarchy of human activity. But why? Arendt
argued that with the rise of modern science came the conviction that “one cannot know
truth as something given and disclosed,” but that “man can at least know what he makes
himself.”202 This attitude, according to Arendt, became the dominate attitude of the
modern age. Making things ourselves became the only way to achieve absolute
knowledge. She explained that the modern belief that man can only fully know what he
himself produces elevated the human being as a creator – or as one who makes things for
the sustainability of life. Labor became a necessity for knowledge. Consequently, the
chief activity of the human being was no longer interaction with others, but in producing
things. Since production for the homo faber is intrinsically linked to self-preservation, the
exclusive role of the modern human was to be violent towards nature “in order to build a
more permanent life for himself.” 203
The problem for Arendt, therefore, was that the human capacity to act in the
modern age was “confined to one single deed.” 204 In other words, action became defined
solely in terms of making. Because action is confined to producing things solely for our
own self-preservation, human beings runs the risk of becoming entirely the same. Arendt
believed that if we all think and act in the same way, we become totally reified beings
201
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without any mark of distinction. If we lose our distinctiveness, human plurality itself is
threatened. The modern era therefore alienates us from who we truly are because it
destroys our individuality. We cease to be creative beings who reveal our distinctiveness
when we engage with others. Instead, the modern human acts only in ways that will
prevent suffering. For Arendt, the danger of modernity is that it makes us all the same.
We lose our individual identities and instead become passive beings that think and act
one-dimensionally. Indeed, Arendt claimed that “it is quite conceivable that the modern
age…may end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity that history has ever known.” 205
At stake for Arendt in her interpretation of German history, therefore, is our
humanity. With the onset of the modern era, we run the risk of losing our particularity
and distinctiveness. Perhaps this is what Arendt was hinting at in her discussion of Adolf
Eichmann. As I explained in chapter two, Arendt did not understand Eichmann as a
totally dominated individual incapable of resisting. But he was someone without any kind
of distinctiveness or creativity. He was the epitome of the modern human being insofar as
he was only concerned with producing things that helped him preserve and advance his
own self-interest. He helped craft and execute the final solution which for him was the
only way to assert himself in the world. The fundamental danger of modernity, therefore,
is not necessarily that by adopting dogmatic worldviews we can perpetuate evil, but that
we cease to be humans at all.
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